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The Ideas of Hungarian Politics on Revision 
in the First Half of the 1920s1
László Tamás Vizi2
In the first half of the 1920s, the Hungarian political elite had to handle the situation 
created by the Trianon Treaty, although the Hungarian foreign politics had very little 
room for manoeuvres against the Little Entente and for the revision of the Trianon 
Treaty. The question arose that without the support of a major power how realistic the 
plans for breaking the ring of the Little Entente around Hungary were, or whether it was 
worth attempting a foreign political action against any Little Entente member state with 
a minimum chance of success without the support of a major power. There were three 
possible responses to the question: (1) waiting and avoiding any unilateral Hungarian 
speculative actions until the support of a major power was given; (2) active Hungarian 
actions without the support of a major power; (3) taking maximum advantage of all 
changing international circumstances while seeking the support of a major power. This 
article analyses the three options and those groups that supported them.
The conclusion is that the Sopron referendum, which managed to alter the Treaty of 
Trianon, demonstrated that the Treaty of Trianon borders could be partly modified with 
the support of major powers and that the right for self-determination of the people based 
on the Wilsonian principles could not be swept completely under the rug partially and 
slightly. However, we should not forget that the referendum that attempted to remedy 
the territorial disputes accompanied by armed clashes between the two defeated nations, 
was a solution which could not be implemented at the beginning of the 1920s with the 
other victorious successor states. As it turned out, this solution was not even applicable 
later. The referendum was not supported by the major powers, neither by the successor 
states. The latter firmly rejected it. With the rejection of the idea of referendums, it was 
exactly that resolution and crisis management method, which was eliminated from the 
options list, the one which could have offered a peaceful and comforting solution for all 
the parties concerned to heal the wounds caused by Trianon.
[Trianon; Revision; Albert Apponyi; István Bethlen; Sopron Referendum]
1 This study is a short, corrected and revised version of the following text: L. T. VIZI, 
Notions by the Hungarian political system concerning revisionist policy during 
the first half of the 1920s, in: L. T. VIZI, Trianon 100 Years Later. From Border Revision to 
National Cooperation (1920–2010), Budapest 2018, pp. 20–49.
2 Research Centre for History, Institute for Hungarian Studies, Kodolányi János 
University, Budapest, Frangepán utca 50–56, 1139 Budapest; lvizi@kodolanyi.hu.
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The latitude of Hungarian politics during the interwar period in relation 
to the Treaty of Trianon was mainly conditioned by the constructive 
cooperation conventions signed in 1920–1921 by Prague, Belgrade and 
Bucharest. These were the so-called Little Entente agreements which 
confined Hungary to a full diplomatic quarantine. The Little Entente, 
which was already conceived during WW I,3 was created by the signing 
parties with the obvious purpose to coordinate their military and political 
actions against the defeated Hungary, as well as to maintain the status-
quo created by Trianon, to prevent Hungarian revisionist aspirations and 
to avert all attempts on the restoration of the Habsburg royal family.4
Hungarian foreign politics had very little room for manoeuvres against 
the Little Entente.5 Consequently, its main purpose was to obtain the 
support of a major power, while it tried to soften the squeeze of the ring of 
the Little Entente around its borders, while the possible undermining of 
such an alliance was determined as an alternative foreign political goal.6 
These goals were quite clear, but there was little consent regarding how 
such goals could be achieved.
Naturally, the question arose that without the support of a major 
power how realistic the plans for breaking the ring of the Little Entente 
around Hungary actually were, or whether it was worth attempting 
a foreign political action against any Little Entente member state with 
a minimum chance of success without the support of a major power. 
There were three possible responses to the question: (1) waiting and 
avoiding any unilateral Hungarian speculative actions until the support 
of a major power was given; (2) active Hungarian actions without the 
3 See also L. GULYÁS (ed.), Zúzzátok szét Ausztria-Magyarországot!, Szeged 1996, pp. 
45–46.
4 M. ÁDÁM, A kisantant 1920–1938, Budapest 1981; M. ÁDÁM, A kisantant és Európa 
1920–1929, Budapest 1989; L. GULYÁS, A kisantant története, in: Rubicon, 2, 2011, 
pp. 68–77. The expression Little Entente was first used by the Budapest newspaper 
Pesti Hírlap in April 1920, when the author of the newspaper referred about the 
cooperation of the three states as “the small Entente”.
5 About the space for diplomatic maneuver, see GY. RÁNKI, Mozgástér és kényszer-
pálya. A Duna-völgyi kis országok a nemzetközi gazdaság és politika rendszerében 
(1919–1945), in: M. LACKÓ (ed.), A két világháború közötti Magyarországról, Budapest 
1984, pp. 11–46; M. ZEIDLER, Mozgástér a kényszerpályán. A magyar külpolitika 
„választásai” a két háború között, in: I. ROMSICS (ed.), Mítoszok, legendák, tévhitek 
a 20. századi magyar történelemről, Budapest 2002, pp. 162–205.
6 About the different alternatives, see L. GULYÁS, A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája I. Az első 
évek 1919–1924, Máriabesnyő 2012, pp. 27–62.
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support of a major power; (3) taking maximum advantage of all changing 
international circumstances while seeking the support of a major power.
During the mid-1920s, the major representatives of the above men-
tioned first foreign political concept were the leaders of the Hungarian 
foreign policy being permanent deputies of the Hungarian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – as well as they filled the position of general secretary 
(secrétaire général)7 of the minister – like Kálmán Kánya8 and Sándor 
Khuen-Héderváry.9 The Hungarian foreign affairs led by Kánya and 
Khuen-Héderváry supported the “prudent awaiting” standpoint and 
opposed any kind of diplomatic action without the support of major 
powers behind it which would have tried to break up the Little Entente 
by unilateral Hungarian actions. They didn’t prefer such initiatives while 
they thought that such actions could be possible if the major power 
scenario changed.
The previously mentioned second foreign political concept was sup-
ported by the new diplomatic elite which entered service during the 
early 1920s as well as by the “racial defenders”, who were members of the 
political opposition. However, the concepts and the latitude of the two 
groups were quite different. The former was mainly restricted by the 
foreign policy administration’s political instructions and by the expected 
loyalty towards these institutions, while the more radical politicians of the 
7 A. HORY, Bukaresttől Varsóig, Budapest 1987. Under press, while Pál Pritz wrote the 
foreword and annotated the manuscript. Regarding the role of general secretary 
(secrétaire général), see Pál Pritz’s comments, which he did in the Hory-memoirs: 
chapter I., annotation number “4” at page 424, and in Chapter II., annotation number 
“2” at page 443.
8 Kálmán Kánya (1869–1945). He initiated his diplomatic career during the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, later he continued his service at the independent Hungarian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Between 1920 and 1925 he was the first deputy of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Between 1925 and 1933, he served as ambassador in Berlin, 
then he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, which position he kept until 1938. 
About Kálmán Kánya, see I. TÓTH, Kánya Kálmán útja a külügyminiszteri székig, in: 
Történelmi Szemle, 2, 2013, pp. 225–260; I. TÓTH, A polgári arisztokrata: Kánya Kálmán 
jellemrajza a kezdetektől a miniszteri posztig, in: Aetas Történettudományi folyóirat, 2, 
2009, pp. 23–43; I. TÓTH, Egy németbarát viszontagságai Berlinben: Kánya Kálmán 
követi évei (1925–1933), in: Soproni Szemle, 2, 2008, pp. 325–338.
9 Sándor Khuen-Héderváry (1881–1947). He was one of the early organizers of the 
autonomous Hungarian foreign diplomatic service and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
after 1918. From 1920 on he headed the political office of the Hungarian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, then he headed the Hungarian Embassy in Paris from 1934 to 1940. 
He retired from politics in 1941.
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opposition were not limited by these factors, so they harshly criticized 
the official Hungarian foreign policy which they considered excessively 
adaptive and conforming, while they called for a more active stance. 
At the same time, we shouldn’t forget that their foreign political views 
were largely dominated by their domestic political circumstances and 
positions.10
The third concept was represented by the most important politician 
of the 1920s, Prime Minister István Bethlen. Bethlen’s activity was not 
confined only to controlling the home affairs of the country. He also had 
a significant influence on foreign affairs as well.11 For Bethlen, it became 
obvious by the early 1920s that Hungary could only achieve the partial 
revision of the Treaty of Trianon with the support of a major power. 
However, such conditions were not present at the time. The Hungarian 
revisionist ambitions weren’t supported by any victorious major power 
in the mid-1920s. Consequently, the foreign policy12 implemented by 
Bethlen positioned itself towards the prudent awaiting stance until the 
European political environment would be more favourable for Budapest. 
Bethlen put it this way: “For Budapest, the only possible foreign policy is to wait 
patiently.”13 However, this did not mean a completely passive one for 
him. He believed that the foreign political playground was shaped by 
the “circumstances”,14 so Bethlen considered the expansion of the foreign 
political margin by small steps and results as a realistic goal. These three 
foreign political alternatives didn’t exist independently from each other, 
rather they coexisted simultaneously and evolved depending on develop-
ments of the international environment.
Although, it was burdened by the heavy political heritage of the 
unfortunate French Franc currency falsification scandal of the mid-1920s, 
the Hungarian foreign policy was presented with a new opportunity: 
an accord between Hungary and Yugoslavia, which had the prospect of 
possibly creating a division inside the Little Entente. However, Hungary’s 
10 P. PRITZ, A fajvédők külpolitikai nézetei (1918–1936), in: Századok, 5–6, 1990, 
pp. 654–657.
11 P. PRITZ, A magyar külügyi szolgálat története az első polgári korszakban (1867–
1948), in: P. PRITZ, Az a „rövid” 20. század, Budapest 2005, p. 80; I. ROMSICS, Bethlen 
István külpolitikája 1921–1931, in: Századok, 5–6, 1990, pp. 577–615.
12 About Bethlen’s foreign policy, see the newest research by L. GULYÁS, A Horthy-korszak 
külpolitikája 2. A húszas évek második fele 1924–1931, Máriabesnyő 2013.
13 Bethlen is quoted by ROMSICS, Bethlen István, p. 588. 
14 Ibid., p. 580.
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foreign political attempt in 1926 to detach Yugoslavia from the Little 
Entente failed.15 Indirectly it was a great achievement for the Hungar-
ian diplomacy, as this action paved the way for the Italian–Hungarian co-
operation implemented by the involved representatives – Hungarian Prime 
Minister István Bethlen and Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini –, 
which resulted in the signing of a mutual friendship, mediation and 
elected court treaty. The treaty signed with Italy enabled Hungary to 
exit the international diplomatic isolation in which it had been since 
the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. Besides this, the treaty signed with 
Rome provided Hungary the long-awaited support of a European major 
power and offered the easing of pressures created by the Little Entente 
in the short run, while it comprised the possibility of the future revision 
of the Treaty of Trianon.
The Hungarian Peace Delegation led by Albert Apponyi in Paris
In his fundamental work on the Hungarian revision,16 Miklós Zeidler 
claims with good reason that the speech given by Albert Apponyi in 
Paris on 16th January 1920 comprised the quintessential notion of the 
Hungarian revision idea. When Apponyi gave his speech, the peace con-
ference in Paris had already been in session for a year and the participants 
were preparing for the celebration of the anniversary of its opening on 
18th January 1919. During the course of that year the victorious nations 
drew the new borders of Europe, while they forced the defeated nations 
to accept them as final. Consequently, during the second half of 1919, 
the following peace treaties were signed: the German one in Versailles 
(28th June 1919), the Austrian one in Saint-Germain (10th September 
1919) and the Bulgarian one in Neuilly (27th November 1919). Only the 
treaty that defined Hungary’s new borders had not been signed yet.17
15 See also in details: L. T. VIZI, „Hiszem és remélem, hogy… hamarosan visszatérhet 
a régi barátság és megértés” Horthy Miklós beszéde és a szerb orientáció alternatívája 
a magyar külpolitikában, in: Közép-Európai Közlemények, 4, 2013, pp. 7–38; L. T. VIZI, 
The Hungarian Effort to Dissolve the Unity of the Little Entente in 1926, in: Prague 
Papers on the History of International Relations, 2, 2013, pp. 134–150.
16 M. ZEIDLER, A revíziós gondolat, Pozsony 2009.
17 On behalf of Hungary, the Trianon Treaty was signed by Minister of Welfare and 
Labor Dr. Ágost Benárd, and by Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Minister Alfréd 
Drasche-Lázár. Regarding their lives, see L. T. VIZI, A trianoni diktátum aláírója: 
a politikus Benárd Ágoston, in: Közép-Európai Közlemények, 10, 2010, pp. 67–79; L. T. 
VIZI, Ki legyen az aláíró? Vita a minisztertanácsban a trianoni békediktátum aláíróinak 
a személyéről, in: Közép-Európai Közlemények, 11, 2010, pp. 109–132; L. T. VIZI, Ki írja 
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This delay could be explained by several reasons: mostly by the Hungar-
ian domestic situation in the spring of 1919 and the following Romanian 
occupation, which extended to most of Hungary, as well as the combined 
result of the above-mentioned events. Hungary didn’t have a government 
which could have been recognized by the Entente.
The victorious Entente powers of WW I, in order to speed up the 
negotiations about the formation of the Hungarian Government, decided 
to send their representative to Budapest in late autumn of 1919. As re-
quested by the council of the five of the Entente Powers, British diplomat 
Sir George Russel Clerk travelled to Budapest on 23rd October 1919. After 
one month of political negotiations, he managed to help the formation18 
of the government led by Károly Huszár on 24th November 1919, which 
was a grand coalition government or as they called it during those years, 
a concentration government. Every relevant political force was represent-
ed in this government. Seats were provided for the representatives of the 
Christian National Union Party, the National Small Landowners Party, the 
United Small Landowners Party, the National Liberal Party, the Hungarian 
Social-Democratic Party and the Agrarian Party as well as for independent 
minister count József Somssich, who was nominated Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.19 Simultaneously with the formation of the government, Clerk 
recognized the Huszár Government with the authorization of the Entente 
as a temporary de-facto government whose mandate lasted until the next 
elections and the formation of a new government. The official recognition 
of the government by the Entente meant that the Entente regarded the 
alá a trianoni békét?, in: Rubicon, 6, 2014, pp. 70–76; L. T. VIZI, Egy elfeledett magyar 
diplomata: Drasche-Lázár Alfréd (https://kgk.sze.hu/images/dokumentumok/
VEABtanulmanyok/vizi_laszlo.pdf), in: “A Felfedező tudomány”, conference book 
published in electronic format, http://kgk.sze.hu/a-felfedezo-tudomany, Veszprém 
2013, pp. 1–9 (visited 2015–12–20); L. T. VIZI, A trianoni békediktátum aláírói az első 
világháborúban, in: I. MAJOROS – A. GÁBOR – P. HEVŐ – A. M. MADARÁSZ (ed.), 
Sorsok, Frontok, Eszmék. Tanulmányok az első világháború 100. évfordulójára, Budapest 2015, 
pp. 307–324; L. T. VIZI, Aláírta Trianont és kezdeményezte Szálasi elmegyógyászati 
vizsgálatát, in: Bécsi Napló, 2, 2012, p. 9; L. T. VIZI, A Magyar Távirati Iroda közleménye 
Benárd Ágost nyugalmazott miniszter népbírósági ítéletéről (1948. október 7.), in: 
Közép-Európai Közlemények, 17, 2012, pp. 42–55.
18 M. ORMOS, Padovától Trianonig 1918–1920, Budapest 1983, pp. 353–367; M. SZINAI, 
Ki lesz a kormányzó?, Budapest 1988, pp. 22–25; GY. RÁNKI, A Clerk-misszió történe-
téhez, in: Századok, 2, 1967, pp. 156–187.
19 Regarding the composition of the Huszár-government, see J. BÖLÖNY – L. HUBAI, 
Magyarország kormányai. 1848–2004, Budapest 2004, p. 94.
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Huszár Government as eligible for taking part in the Paris peace negotia-
tions. Meanwhile the Entente endorsed Clerk’s written report (written 
on 29th November) as well as his verbal report (given on 1st December 
1919) on the achievements of his diplomatic mission in Hungary. Clerk 
notified his superiors in these reports that the Hungarians were probably 
going to nominate count Albert Apponyi as leader of the Hungarian peace 
delegation. Simultaneously, he expressed his positive views on count 
Apponyi.20 However, a fierce debate erupted when it became public that 
Apponyi would be leading the Hungarian delegation.21 Except for Italy’s 
peace delegation representative, De Martino, all other members of the 
council (French Prime Minister G. B. Clemenceau, British chief delegate 
Eyre Crowe, the director of the Trade and Political Department of the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affair Philippe Berthelot, the representative 
of the United States Frank Lyon Polk) didn’t accept Apponyi. They raised 
several objections against him. Berthelot described him as “aggressively 
pro-German, who always supported the oppression of small minorities”. The debate 
was ended by Clemenceau, who said that he wasn’t a supporter of count 
Apponyi, but “it was very difficult to stop his arrival. The Council never gave orders 
to the hostile nations on how they should formulate their delegations, and he did 
not believe in the existence of a law that would sanction who was allowed to come to 
the negotiations […] it was up to the Hungarians to decide which solution would 
serve their cause the best.”22
During the General Council session of the peace conference which 
began on 1st December 1919 a decision was made based on the recom-
mendations of Clemenceau, the Prime Minister of the French Republic 
(no less than ten and a half months after the official opening of the confer-
ence). First, it allowed count Albert Apponyi to attend the conference, 
second, they sent an official notice to the Hungarian Government to ask 
them to send their own representatives to the peace conference in Neuilly, 
near Paris, for the official handover of the planned peace conditions for 
Hungary.23
20 I. ROMSICS, A trianoni békeszerződés, Budapest 2005, p. 143.
21 The dispute was presented by J. GALÁNTAI, A trianoni békekötés 1920. A Párizsi meghí-
vástól a ratifikálásig, Budapest 1990, pp. 72–73; ROMSICS, A trianoni, pp. 143–144.
22 GALÁNTAI, p. 72.
23 A magyar béketárgyalások (1920). Jelentés a magyar békeküldöttség működéséről Neuilly-ben, 
Volumes I–III, Budapest 1920, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary (Magyar 
Királyi Külügyminisztérium).
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After these precedents, as the Entente urged Hungary on 10th De-
cember to make a decision, on 12th December 1919 the Hungarian 
Government selected the following seven general representatives with 
count Albert Apponyi as president: counts Pál Teleki and István Bethlen, 
former Minister of Finance Sándor Popovics, Foreign Secretary baron 
Vilmos Lers, count László Somssich, the president of the Hungarian 
Economic Association, former Minister of Justice Béla Zoltán as well as 
agriculture secretary Iván Ottlyk. The task of the operative management 
of the Hungarian peace conference delegation was given to ambassador 
extraordinary and delegated minister Iván Praznovszky.24 Besides them 
there were several delegates, specialists of several fields, councillors, 
secretaries, translators, journalists, etc., who helped the work of the 
delegation.25 Of these people we have to mention Jenő Benda26 the 
journalist of the Pesti Hírlap newspaper who accompanied the delegation 
to Paris. While he constantly informed the Hungarian public about the 
events in Paris, he also provided important information to the members 
of the Hungarian delegation on several occasions, using his connections 
and his capacity to move freely.
The Hungarian peace delegation was led by Albert Apponyi and com-
prised of 73 members. Following the problems caused by the Christmas 
holidays as well as the arrangement of the private train, they finally 
departed Budapest by rail on 5th January 1920.27 The delegation arrived 
at the Paris railway station on 7th January 1920.28 The Entente politicians 
tried to completely isolate the Hungarian delegation from the French 
political and public representatives, so they accommodated them in the 
hotel Chateau de Madrid situated in Neuilly, which back then was on the 
24 A Monarchiától Trianonig egy magyar diplomata szemével. Praznovszky Iván emlékezései. The 
documents and the pictures were selected by M. ZEIDLER, who wrote the forewords 
and annotated the manuscript, Budapest 2012.
25 Among others the leadership of the Budapest Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
was part of this circle, as well as several members of its foreign trade board were also 
part of it. Regarding this, see P. K. ZACHAR, Gazdaság, politika, érdekképviselet. Fejezetek 
a magyar és európai gazdasági kamarák történetéből, Budapest 2016, pp. 113–116.
26 J. BENDA, A béke kálvária útján. Egy újságíró naplója a párizsi békekonferenciáról, Budapest 
1920; newest edition: A béke kálváriaútján. Egy újságíró naplója a párizsi békekonferenciáról, 
Budapest 2013.
27 The activities of the Hungarian delegation in Paris is detailed by ZEIDLER, A revíziós, 
pp. 26–40; GULYÁS, A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája I., pp. 18–19.
28 The journey of the peace delegation led by Apponyi is presented by BENDA, 
pp. 15–28.
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outskirts of Paris, and they also severely restricted the movements of the 
Hungarian delegation in the city.
The agenda of the peace conference was disadvantageous for Hunga-
ry.29 As a defeated country, Hungary was not invited to the initial part 
of the conference, notably to the part where they the new borders were 
defined. Consequently, in Versailles negotiating parties decided about the 
future of Hungary without the participation of Hungarian representatives. 
After Apponyi had been kept awaiting30 for almost a week, they asked 
him to present his credentials on 14th January to the president of the 
Supreme Council and at the same time to hand over the memorandum 
of the official position of Hungary. The next day, on 15th January 1920 at 
4 p.m., on behalf of the peace conference, Clemenceau handed over the 
draft plan of the Hungarian peace treaty to the Hungarian delegation31 
in the Red Chamber of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs building 
near the river Seine. During this meeting, which lasted only a couple of 
minutes, Clemenceau explained that they would accept the Hungarian 
request and consequently the next day – on 16th January – Apponyi 
would have the opportunity to summarize and explain the position of 
Hungary.32
The Day of Apponyi’s Great Exposé
Apponyi had the opportunity to officially express his opinion about the 
draft plan on 16th January 1920.33 His speech was given at 3 p.m. in the 
building of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Quai d’Orsay), in the 
room of Minister of Foreign Affairs Stephen Pichon, where the sessions of 
the Supreme Council had been held previously. The victorious five great 
powers were represented personally by the Prime Ministers of France, 
Great Britain and Italy, namely Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George 
and Francesco Nitti. The United States and Japan were represented by 
their ambassadors in Paris, namely Hugh Campbell Wallace and Matsui 
29 M. FÜLÖP – P. SÍPOS, Magyarország külpolitikája a XX. században, Budapest 1998, p. 52.
30 Regarding the details of this issue, see GULYÁS, A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája I., 
pp. 18–19.
31 The activities of the Hungarian peace delegation are presented in detail by BENDA, 
pp. 55–58.
32 F. DEÁK – D. ÚJVÁRY (ed.), Papers and Documents to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, 
Vol I. 1919–1920 (hereafter PDH), Budapest 1939, p. 860.
33 Regarding the legends on the Apponyi-speech, see B. ABLONCZY, Trianon-legendák, 
Budapest 2015, pp. 53–66.
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Keishirō, who took part in the meeting, while the British Foreign Secre-
tary Lord George Curzon and French Minister of Foreign Affairs Stephen 
Pichon were also present.34
At the beginning of the session, Clemenceau, without any introduc-
tion, asked the representative of the Hungarian delegation to proceed 
with his presentation, while he offered Apponyi to give his presentation 
seated. Apponyi reacted to this with his usual elegant style and politeness, 
saying: “Please allow me to give my presentation standing up, because I have 
accustomed to it in such manner and because I like it that way!”35 The logic and 
idea36 of his speech, which he gave in French, started with the declaration 
that the peace conditions proposed for Hungary “are unacceptable without 
substantial changes”.37 Then he continued: “We cannot hide the fact that we 
are appalled by the extreme severity of the peace conditions.”38 Mostly because 
if these conditions are the final ones, Hungary will lose two-thirds of its 
territory and population. Above all, these peace conditions were drafted 
by the victorious powers without listening the Hungarian side or its 
representatives.
After this introduction, Apponyi continued his speech pointing out the 
ethnic-national arguments. He emphasized that out of 11 million people 
who were going to be detached from Hungary, 35% (3.5 million) were 
Hungarians. A large ethnic Hungarian minority was going to be artificially 
annexed to other countries and consequently the new successor states, 
from an ethnic and national point of view, were “going to be more fragmented 
than the former historical Hungary”. Connected to this argument, Apponyi 
also highlighted and illustrated the fact that the ethnic minority rights 
claimed by the Entente powers would not and could not be implemented 
in the successor states at all.
In this section of his speech, Apponyi introduced a new argument 
which had never been mentioned before, notably the cultural superiority 
34 The minutes of the January 16th session are published by many sources, so does the 
Documents on British Foreign Policy. First Series, 1919–1939, Vol II, London 1948–1958, 
pp. 900–910.
35 BENDA, p. 60.
36 For the analyses of the speech, see GULYÁS, A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája I., pp. 19–23; 
ABLONCZY, pp. 53–66.
37 The speech is published in the book A magyar béketárgyalások. Jelentés a magyar 
békeküldöttség működéséről Neuilly s/S.-ben 1920 januárius-március havában. I, Budapest 
1920, pp. 276–282.
38 Ibid.
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theory, and he went on focusing on this issue. He argued that compared 
to the majority of the nationalities of the successor states (Slovaks, 
Romanians and Serbs), Hungarians were at a far more culturally enhanced 
level. He justified his statements with actual numbers, using two pieces 
of data: among Hungarians the literacy rate reached almost 80%, among 
Romanians it stood at 33%, while among Serbs it was 59%. Among the 
Hungarian upper class, 84% had a secondary school education, while 
among the Romanian upper class this rate was only 4%. Appponyi’s claim 
could have backfired, and it could have been used as a weapon against 
Hungarians themselves: Apponyi’s data could have been used as a fact to 
demonstrate Hungarian oppression against ethnic minorities. However, 
returning to Apponyi’s argument and according to his opinion, if Hungar-
ians, who were at a more enhanced cultural level then, would be subjected 
to nations who were at a lower cultural level, universal human culture 
would suffer as a consequence. Regarding this issue, Apponyi presented 
two issues which significantly supported Hungarian claims: he notified 
his audience about the sad fate of the famous Hungarian universities of 
Kolozsvár and Pozsony where dozens of esteemed Hungarian professors 
had been expelled by the authorities of the successor states.39
Apponyi then continued his speech with the topic of the self-deter-
mination of nationalities. Essentially, he illustrated the principle based 
on US President Wilson’s declaration on the right of self-determination 
of nationalities, which according to him offered the only comforting 
solution to resolve the problem. According to Apponyi, the solution to 
the problem was the following: “[…] in order to establish what the reality is, 
we can use only one simple instrument, which we request loudly so that we can see 
clearly in this matter. This instrument is the referendum. While we request this, we 
refer to President Wilson’s declaration in which he so excellently expressed these 
great principles. According to these principles, not a single group of people, nor 
people in a part of a state can be placed under the authority of a foreign country 
involuntarily without their consent, like some flock of cattle. In the name of this great 
idea, which by the way is an axiom of reason and common sense, we request popular 
39 Regarding the persecution of the Hungarian professors, see P. KOUDELA, Négy város 
– négy fejlődési modell, Budapest 2016. Regarding Eperjes, see P. KOUDELA, Protestant 
Education behind Policy: The History of the Lutheran Collegium in Eperjes, Austria-
Hungary in the 19th century, in: Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional 
Studies, 6, 2014, pp. 103–121. Regarding Kassa: P. KOUDELA, A magyar polgárosodás 
egy alternatívája a Felvidéken: egy kassai tanár, Sziklay Ferenc élete, in: Limes, 2, 2002, 
pp. 85–105.
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referendums in those parts of our country which are planned to be separated from us. 
I hereby declare that we will accept the results of these referendums, no matter what 
the results will be. […] Basically, this is our main request we submit to the peace 
conference. If the reasons we presented for you in order to keep the historical Hungary 
together are not enough, in that case we propose you should ask the concerned 
population about these plans. We hereby subject ourselves to their decision.”40 So 
Apponyi formulated the Hungarian request for referendums, which in 
a paradox way was held in Sopron only, and the surrounding area, while 
in those regions where Hungarians constituted the linguistic and ethnic 
majority such referendums were never held.
It can be debated whether it was a good idea to ask for a referendum 
for all the lands that were destined to be taken away from Hungary, or 
they should have requested referendums only around the new Hungarian 
borders where the majority of the Hungarian people lived, although this is-
sue is difficult to judge nowadays. Arguments can be listed to support both 
alternatives, although the possible answer remains a fiction, especially if 
we take into consideration the fact that the victorious nations did not 
accept the Hungarian arguments and refused to radically modify the draft 
of the peace treaty. However, by accepting and implementing the referen-
dums a far more righteous and legitimate situation would have emerged.
Following the notion on the referendums, Apponyi presented a new 
element among his arguments, namely the integration of minority rights 
into his speech. Apponyi presented the rightful issue in his speech: “[…] 
are ethnic minority rights going to have more guarantees for protection in the new 
states compared to what they used to have in the historical Hungary.”41 Apponyi 
gave a double answer to his own question. First, he dwelled upon the issue 
that Hungary’s ethnic minority policy was far better, or even more modern 
than what they could expect from the new states. Second, he intended to 
prove that since the new states took over lands from the historical Hun-
gary, already serious atrocities occurred against the Hungarian minority 
and they could only expect far worse things to occur in the future. He 
ended his arguments about minority rights with these ideas: “[…] in case 
they will force territorial changes upon us in the final settlement, we demand more 
effective and detailed minority rights protection guarantees than the ones we have 
been provided with in the draft of the peace treaty.”42
40 M. ZEIDLER, Trianon, Budapest 2003, pp. 123–124.
41 Ibid., p. 124.
42 Ibid.
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After this, Apponyi’ introduced two more new arguments. He placed 
an emphasis on historical arguments, and he highlighted the strategic 
and security related issues connected to Hungary, together with the old 
notion that Hungary had acted as the defense bastion of Europe for cen-
turies. “This land – Apponyi emphasized – which constitutes Hungary and legally 
is still is part of Hungary, has played a very important role in the defense of Europe 
for centuries, especially for the maintenance of peace and security in Central Europe 
[…] safety was ensured only from that period when the defense line represented 
by Hungary came into existence. In order to maintain peace and continuity, it is 
highly important that the instability of Eastern Europe should not spread towards 
the heart of Europe […] the historical Hungary fulfilled this role by maintaining 
the stability and the equilibrium, while securing the peace of Europe from the 
threats originating from the East. Hungary has fulfilled this duty for ten centuries, 
which was secured by its organic integrity.”43 Consequently Hungary defended 
Europe from threats coming from the east. Apponyi pointed out that the 
dismemberment of this region that had a territorial integrity which was 
well defined from a security aspect as well would cause or might cause 
the vulnerability of this region inflicting unforeseeable consequences.
As Apponyi was approaching the end of his speech, he explained his 
strongest intended argument, the geographical–economic44 aspects, 
which the head of the Hungarian delegation summarized as such: “In all 
of Europe, the historical Hungary constitutes a naturally unique geographic and 
economic unity. Along all of her territories no natural borders could be drawn, none 
of her parts could be severed without damaging the others. This is the reason why 
history kept this region integrated for ten centuries […] Hungary is possessing all 
the conditions of organic integrity, except for ethnic integrity […] the new states 
which will be created in Hungary’s place will disregard the natural borders created 
by geography and will block the natural internal migration […].”45
The geographic and economic arguments had already appeared in 
Apponyi’s speech, as during his presentation he had already made refer-
ences regarding what he intended to do about the previously mentioned 
issues. He explained the relationship between the borderlands and the 
internal lands, and that if the borderlands were severed from the internal 
regions, the central regions would be definitely deprived of the natural 
43 Ibid., p. 125.
44 Regarding these issues, see L. GULYÁS, A magyar revízió földrajzi érvrendszerének első 
nyilvános megjelenése: Apponyi Albert 1920. január 16-i beszéde, in: Történeti Földrajzi 
Közlemények, 1, 2015, pp. 151–164.
45 ZEIDLER, Trianon, pp. 125–126.
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resources which were necessary for the economic development of the 
region, namely the central region would be deprived of minerals, salt, 
timber for the construction industry, crude oil, natural gas as well as 
its labour force. Consequently, he argued, for maintaining the organic 
unity of historical Hungary, and he made an attempt to prove that the 
new states would destroy a natural union, preventing the useful internal 
migration of labour force, which would disrupt and terminate economic 
traditions which had lasted for centuries.
Above all – Apponyi continued – the new states would be the centres 
of irredentism. The Hungarian fear is legitimate “[…] instead of the pillar 
of stability, new centres of instability would be formed”.46 According to him, as 
the ethnic minorities of the new states will be at a higher cultural level 
than the majority, the emerging and already present irredentism will not 
only endanger but actually threaten to burst the new states. Besides this, 
the new states are threatened by the incapacity to efficiently organize the 
economic system of regions inhabited by ethnic minorities, who are at 
a higher cultural level, and consequently these states will not be capable 
of integrating these regions into their economies, thus these regions will 
face a serious economic atrophy in the future. Therefore, the economic 
downturn, especially unemployment, will necessarily create a moral 
decline that will cause the advancement of bolshevism. Apponyi phrased 
it as follows: “The new states […] will be undermined by the irredentism of those 
nationalities, who will feel the rule of foreign states as well as the hegemony of 
culturally less advanced nations. Here we have to identify an organic impossibility 
[…] Central Europe could only be protected from the dangers coming from the East 
if we will preserve the historical Hungarian territories intact.”47
After Apponyi finished48 his speech which he had presented both in 
46 Ibid., p. 125.
47 Ibid.
48 Jenő Benda, who was a witness to the event, report as such: “So Apponyi repeated 
everything he said in English as well, adapting to the English way of thinking. This how it follows: 
French and English tracks are following each other in turn. Apponyi uses the two languages with 
the same gracefulness, clear pronunciation and articulation. Originally his plan was to first 
present his speech in French and then in English, but now he has divided it into two languages, 
switching between them every ten minutes […] then he turns towards Nitti in order to say a few 
words in Italian as well. He knows that Nitti understood his French speech, so it’s not necessary 
to repeat what he said. He just wanted to reminder the Italian statesman that there were times 
when the Italian and Hungarian armies were not fighting against each other, but fought together 
against others.” BENDA, pp. 61–62. The brief speech in Italian that Apponyi presented 
was about to remind that although in this war the Hungarians and Italians fought 
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French and in English and summarized in Italian as well, the president of 
the Supreme Council, Clemenceau asked the other members if anyone 
had any questions. Lloyd George said, “Yes I, do” and asked for permission 
to ask.49 Lloyd George’s actual question was this: “Are there Hungarians 
 living in ethnic territorial blocks beyond the new borders of Hungary?” 50 The 
 British Prime Minister was actually interested in how many Hungarians 
would live outside the new Hungarian borders in the neighbouring states. 
He was especially interested in the geographic location of the Hungarian 
population; whether they would be situated along the new Hungarian 
borders, or far away from the new borders in isolated linguistic areas. 
At this point Apponyi – claiming that he could not hear him properly 
– took his chair and settled at Lloyd George’s table and showed him 
the ethnographic map of the historical Hungary that was based on the 
national census of 1910, where the Hungarian people were indicated in 
red – this is why the Hungarian historians call this map “red map” (carte 
rouge) – which at the same time indicated the population density as well. 
On the same morning Pál Teleki already drew on the map the new Hungar-
ian borders proposed by the Entente, so Lloyd George could precisely 
see that according to the peace treaty, it was not the distant ethnic block 
areas that would primarily be given to foreign states but rather the ethni-
cally homogenous Hungarian lands along the new borders. Meanwhile 
Apponyi explained the map to Lloyd George, “who leaned over the map and 
showed interest” while several important politicians – like British Foreign 
Secretary Lord Curzon and Italian Prime Minister Nitti – came to the 
table. Jenő Benda reported the event: “Lord Curzon came closer. Nitti stood 
up from his place and leaned over the map. The secretaries gathered as well and 
observed the event from a proper distance. Matsui, the short statured Japanese came 
closer trying to see something, but Nitti’s wide shoulders blocked his view. Apponyi 
started to explain the map in detail. Clemenceau was watching this from his place 
for a few minutes, then he got up and went beside Apponyi, who was showing 
one after another the great red spots of ethnic Hungarians left in the regions of 
against each other, but he (Nitti) couldn’t forget how many times the Hungarians 
and Italians bled together in the battlefields fighting along each other for freedom. 
Referring to this historical fact, Apponyi asked Italy to show her goodwill during 
the Hungarian peace negotiations. The speech of Apponyi is not fully recorded, as 
the Italian part is not published. Regarding the Italian part of the speech, see PPC, 
IX book, p. 883.
49 Lloyd George’s comment is presented by ROMSICS, A trianoni, p. 156.
50 BENDA, p. 63.
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Csallóköz, Ruszka-Krajna, Transylvania, Arad and Bačka: these were the bleeding 
parts of the Hungarian nation.”51
Ignác Romsics sees the reason for Lloyd George’s question to Apponyi 
not as the British Prime Minister’s lack of knowledge. On the contrary, 
Lloyd George intended to help him. Lloyd George’s aim was to indirectly 
show the Hungarian count in which direction he should continue his ar-
guments.52 Namely to give up his imperial-style comments on the planned 
peace treaty in order to focus on the national-based critique of the 
treaty, so that he shouldn’t refuse the entire peace treaty but concentrate 
exclusively on ethnic demands instead. Namely the Hungarian delegation 
should not request a referendum for all the separated lands – which 
wouldn’t have meant a full and integral revision – but only limit their 
demands to the lands inhabited completely by ethnic Hungarians along 
the new borders, attempting to regain at least those regions. However, 
we could interpret these arguments as a reassurance of one’s conscience 
as Lloyd George wrote down these thoughts ten years after the events. 
If Lloyd George had had a serious intent, as a British Prime Minister he 
would have had all the capabilities to raise his perception to the level of 
the official British point of view and initiate the implementation of ethni-
cal borders. Though, he didn’t present a definite argument in this issue, 
not even a suggestion. Analysing the question raised by Lloyd George, we 
do not consider it as the official British point of view and we suggest not 
to overestimate its significance. After the short in-between issue of Lloyd 
George, there were no further relevant questions on the topic. The only 
further question raised in connection with Lloyd George’s question was 
that whether the Hungarians were able to support Apponyi’s statements 
with any documentation. Apponyi responded that they could read them 
in detail in the Hungarian memorandum which had already been handed 
over. Simultaneously “He offered the maps to Lloyd George, which he gladly 
accepted.” At the same time, he indicated that “They are going to dispatch 
similar maps to the representatives of the major powers the next morning.”53 When 
the negotiations ended, Clemenceau closed the session at 4.10 p.m. The 
Hungarian delegation and Apponyi returned to Budapest on 20th January 
with the draft of the peace treaty, in order to jointly discuss it with the 
Hungarian politicians and decide what to do next.
51 Ibid., p. 64. 
52 ROMSICS, A trianoni, pp. 156–157.
53 BENDA, pp. 64–65.
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The Apponyi-speech and the Hungarian Arguments for Revision
Without any doubt, Apponyi’s speech given on 16th January 1920 became 
the basis of the Hungarian revisionist idea. In order to preserve the in-
tegrity of the historical Hungary, in his speech Apponyi built up a system 
of argumentation that was composed from multiple layers. These layers 
were composed by the memorandums that the Hungarian Government 
sent to the peace conference, while they became more and more extended 
due to maps and statistical charts, and they could be well confined to the 
following argument systems:54 
- focusing on the argument regarding the right for self-determination 
of nationalities, based on US President Wilson’s declaration,
- reviewing the strategic and security policy arguments,
- emphasizing the historical arguments,
- reviewing the arguments deriving from civilizational duty (mission),
- focusing on geographic and economic arguments.
The Hungarian reference to the ethnic principle and Wilson’s declara-
tion was as follows: if “small nations” – Romanians, Serbs, Slovaks – have 
been allowed the Wilsonian self-determination, then the 3.5 million 
Hungarians destined to live abroad also have the right to claim such 
rights. This kind of Hungarian reasoning could have been acceptable 
for the Entente. However, the Hungarian delegation did not request 
a referendum for limited and smaller geographic areas but required 
a referendum for the entire historical Hungarian territory. This would have 
put into question the entire Central European territorial arrangement. 
Obviously, this solution was unacceptable for the Entente powers, even 
if the Hungarians announced in advance that they would accept the 
outcome of the possible referendum.
The “Hungary, as the defender of the West” slogan used by the Hungarians 
in the 1920s for their strategic and security arguments was problematic, as 
the victorious Entente intended exactly to create the “New Central Europe” 
from the Central European “victorious nations” such as Poles, Czechoslo-
vaks, Romanians and Yugoslavs, not from the defeated and truncated 
Hungary. A British memo created on 16th February 1920, which was 
sent from the Foreign Office to High Commissioner Hohler in Budapest, 
expressed this as follows: “[…] this is what concerns the security interests of 
the British Empire: the Romanians, Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs will form a forty 
million block altogether, which we hope will form a better defensive line against 
54 GULYÁS, A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája I., p. 25.
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Germany than seven or ten million Hungarians.”55 The historical arguments 
were the weakest ones in the Hungarian argumentative system. This was 
caused by two factors. One was identified by Gusztáv Gratz when he 
explained it in his memoirs: “The issues which were discussed by the Hungarian 
delegation from a legal and historical point of view were usually analysed by foreign 
statesmen from the point of view of political practicality. The historical aspects were 
secondary matters in the minds of the members of the peace conference.”56
The other factor was that the Romanians used their own Dacian-Roman 
continuity theory57 against the 1000-year-old Hungarian statehood 
notion, while the Czechoslovaks used the “Great Moravian Empire” theory 
against it.58
The cultural arguments – the emphasis is on the high culture of the 
Hungarians – proved to be a double-edged sword. While they colonized 
Africa and Asia, the French and the British proclaimed the cultural 
superiority of white people, thus for them seeing an emphasis put on 
Hungarian cultural superiority in the Carpathian Basin was not strange. 
However, this Hungarian item – regarding the nation building capacity 
of the Hungarian people as well as their high culture – could have turned 
against the Hungarians as well. Namely that the ethnic minorities of 
the historical Hungary are underdeveloped and backward because the 
Hungarians brutally oppressed them in the past.
The geographic and economic arguments highlighted the natural geo-
graphical unity of the Carpathian Basin – for example the unified water 
systems – presented the well-functioning labour structure, especially 
its dimensional structure, the dependence of decisive regions on each 
other.
Compared to the cultural and historical arguments, the geographic 
and economic arguments were the strongest ones in the Hungarian 
argumentation.59 Their force was secured by the fact that they relied on 
real facts – above all, they were supported by maps and serious statistical 
series of data – consequently they could not be effectively denied.
55 The memo is presented by I. ROMSICS, A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés”, 
1914–1946, in: I. ROMSICS (ed.), Helyünk és sorsunk a Duna-medencében, Budapest 
2005, pp. 34–131.
56 G. GRATZ, A forradalmak kora, Budapest 1935, p. 306.
57 ZEIDLER, A revíziós, p. 55.
58 Regarding the Czechoslovak arguments, see L. GULYÁS, Edvard Beneš. Közép-Európa 
koncepciók és a valóság, Máriabesnyő 2008, pp. 147–157.
59 ZEIDLER, A revíziós, pp. 53–54.
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Analysing the economic progress of Central Europe during the inter- 
war period, we can assess the negative economic development that Ap-
ponyi predicted – the difficulties of economic reconstruction60 as well 
as the regional development differences among the successor states61 
– prevailingly became a reality.
Apponyi’s speech determined the revisionist external policy of the 
Horthy era for a long time, mainly the theoretic basis founded on the 
integrity concept. Apponyi celebrated his 75th birthday in May 1921, as 
well as the 50th anniversary of his public activity. In the following years, 
until his death in February 1933 he remained the most important figure 
of the Hungarian revisionist movement. In many of his speeches62 given 
in Hungary and abroad, he explained and widened again and again the 
arguments of the Hungarian revision, while he formulated his critique 
on the Trianon dictate, which is still valid. The scene of his activity was 
mainly Geneva, where as the chief delegate of the Hungarian Government 
he represented the interests63 of Hungary until his death.64
When the “Zero” Solution Proposed by Apponyi Worked after All: 
the Sopron Referendum
As we have already mentioned and cited from Albert Apponyi’s speech 
given on 16th January 1920, Apponyi explained the Hungarian point of 
view, where he requested a referendum on historical lands the winners 
were planning to separate from Hungary, while he upheld the unilateral 
obligation of Hungary to accept the outcome of the referendum without 
reservations and accept the result as final. Although Apponyi’s  referendum 
60 F. SZÁVAI, Az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia felbomlásának következményei. Az államutódlás 
vitás kérdései, Pécs 2004.
61 Regarding the Yugoslav and the Czechoslovak states, see L. GULYÁS, Két régió – Felvidék 
és Vajdaság – sorsa az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchiától napjainkig, Budapest 2005. Regarding 
generally the crisis of the liberal economic policy, see P. K. ZACHAR, Kiútkeresés 
a liberális gazdaság- és államszervezés válságából a 20. század első felében Európában, 
in: P. K. ZACHAR (ed), Gazdaság, társadalom, hivatásrendiség a 20. századi Európában, 
Budapest 2013, pp. 13–36.
62 L. T. VIZI, „Trianon teóriájánál… rosszabb Trianon praxisa”. A békediktátum tízedik 
évfordulója 1930, in: Közép-Európai Közlemények, 22, 2013, pp. 120–131; L. T. VIZI, 
Az Országgyűlés Képviselőházának és Felsőházának megemlékezése a trianoni 
békediktátum 10. évfordulóján, in: Trianoni Szemle, January-June 2014, pp. 49–61.
63 For more information, see M. PÉTER, Gróf Apponyi Albert halála és temetése, in: 
Belvedere Meridionale, 4–8, 2008, pp. 4–16.
64 Ibid.
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proposal attempt on 16th January 1920 was not successful, the major 
powers did not reject irrevocably the idea of a possible referendum, as 
a potential tool for reparation. Although they had not implemented 
this solution for the entire historical Hungarian territories, just as they 
had not done it in the lands along the new Hungarian borders, they only 
implemented it on a 257 km2 territory, which comprised Sopron and 
eight surrounding villages (Ágfalva, Balf, Fertőboz, Fertőrákos, Harka, 
Kópháza, Nagycenk and Sopronbánfalva), where the Entente powers 
allowed the local people to exert their right for self-determination. 
However, the preceding events of this referendum were that the popula-
tion of the threatened lands, with the help of the free military units who 
tacitly had the support of the Hungarian government, simply boycotted 
or averted the annexation of these territories to Austria. The upheaval 
in Hungary was well illustrated by the statement of Hungarian Foreign 
Minister and Minister without portfolio for national minorities, Gusztáv 
Gratz (in office from 17th January 1921 to 12th April 1921), “world history 
has never witnessed that a defeated state had ripped apart the territories of her 
defeated former ally and even accomplished territorial gains”.65 Ultimately 
the Entente Powers decided to resolve the ever increasing dispute be-
tween Austria and Hungary by ordering them to send special envoys 
to resolve the issue in Western Hungary. The negotiations took place in 
Venice, where Hungary was represented by Prime Minister István Bethlen 
and Foreign Minister Miklós Bánffy.66 As a result of the negotiations, 
on 13th October 1921 they reached an agreement to hold a referendum 
regarding the affiliation of the city of Sopron and its surrounding areas. 
The date of the referendum in Sopron was set for 14th December, in Brenn-
berg for 15th December, while in the other towns the referendum was 
set for 16th December. A contemporary witness reported on the  Sopron 
referendum: “The great day came, the famous Wednesday of 14th December 
1921. The citizens of the city were already awake early in the morning. All the bells 
of the churches were ringing. All the people were called for prayer, all of those who 
prayed for God, in order to give testimony of their everlasting loyalty. In our church, 
Lajos Ziermann gave a sermon in Hungarian and German, and warned us about 
the Fourth Commandment. This commandment applies to the homeland as well. 
65 K. HANZMANN, Helyzetrajz és adalékok a soproni ágostai hitvallású evangélikus egyházközség 
1900–1950. évi történetéhez. I. Rész. A korszak krónikája, Sopron 2000, p. 67.
66 The details of the Venice negotiations are presented by M. BÁNFFY, Egy erdélyi gróf 
emlékiratai, Budapest 2013, pp. 261–271.
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The homeland is our father and mother. Those who are faithful to its creed, must be 
faithful to its homeland as well. ‘Do you love your mother?’ his voice trembled, his 
feelings spread among his worshippers, while we sang altogether in trembling voice 
‘A Mighty Fortress is Our God!’
The polling stations located in different parts of the city opened at 8 a.m. To 
each committee of the given polling station, a local pro-Hungarian and a local 
pro-Austrian person was assigned. However, not a single pro-Austrian signed up 
for this duty.”67
These were the results of the Sopron referendum held on 21th December 
1921:68
Entitled to 
vote
Votes casted 
for Hungary
Votes casted 
for Austria Invalid votes
18,994 citizens 12,327 4,620 351
Citizens who 
casted their 
votes
Votes casted 
for Hungary
Votes casted 
for Austria
Formally 
declined to 
vote or invalid 
votes
17,298 citizens 71.26% 26.7% 2.04%
The following chart shows the referendum results69 of the eight towns 
surrounding Sopron area:
Town’s 
name
Entitled 
to vote
Citizens 
who 
voted
Votes 
casted 
for
Hungary
Votes 
casted 
for
Austria
Invalid 
votes
Percentage 
of the votes 
casted for
Hungary
Ágfalva 1,148 citizens 848 148 682 18 17%
Balf    668 citizens 595 229 349 17 38%
Fertőboz    349 citizens 342 257 74 11 75%
67 HANZMANN, p. 73.
68 Ibid., p. 74. 
69 Ibid.
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Town’s 
name
Entitled 
to vote
Citizens 
who 
voted
Votes 
casted for 
Hungary
Votes 
casted for 
Austria
Invalid 
votes
Percentage 
of the votes 
casted for 
Hungary
Fertőrákos 1,525 citizens 1,370 525 812 33 38%
Harka    688 citizens 581 55 517 9 9%
Kópháza    948 citizens 813 550 243 30 67%
Nagycenk 1,041 citizens 1,039 1,026 5 8 99%
Bánfalva 1,539 citizens 1,177 217 925 35 18%
Altogether 7,906 citizens 6,765 3,007 3,607 161 45.125%
According to the following chart, as the result of the referendum held 
between 14th–16th December 1921, the citizens of Sopron and the sur-
rounding area, 65.8% of those who actually cast their votes, decided to 
join the Hungarian state:70 
Citizens 
entitled to 
vote
(altogether)
Votes casted 
(altogether)
Votes 
casted for 
Hungary
Votes 
casted for 
Austria
Invalid 
votes
Percentage 
of the Votes
casted for
Hungary
26,900 
citizens
24,063 
citizens
15,334 
citizens
8,227 
citizens
502 
citizens 65.8%
The resolution which made the results official was made public on 24th De-
cember 1921 by General Ferrario, who was the president of the Allied 
Generals Commission: “The Allied Generals Commission attests the results of 
the 18th December referendum, which were published by the central committee. 
Due to these results and according to agreements stipulated by the Venice treaty, 
 
70 GULYÁS, A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája I., pp. 118–119; HANZMANN, pp. 67–75.
47
L. T. Vizi, The Ideas of Hungarian Politics on Revision
the referendum areas will pass to Hungary, and these areas will be taken over by 
Hungary from the Allied Generals Commission on 1st January 1922.”71
The Sopron referendum, which managed to partially and slightly alter 
the Treaty of Trianon, demonstrated that the Treaty of Trianon borders 
could be partly modified with the support of major powers and that the 
right for self-determination of the people based on the Wilsonian princi-
ples could not be swept under the rug. However, we should not forget that 
the referendum attempted to remedy the territorial disputes which were 
accompanied by armed clashes between the two defeated nations, a solu-
tion which could not be implemented at the beginning of the 1920s with 
the other victorious successor states. As it turned out, this solution was 
not even applicable later. The referendum was not supported by the major 
powers, neither by the successor states. The latter firmly rejected it. With 
the rejection of the idea of referendums, it was exactly that resolution and 
crisis management method which was eliminated from the options list, 
the one which could have offered a peaceful and comforting solution for 
all the parties concerned in order to heal the wounds caused by Trianon.
71 HANZMANN, p. 75.

